The cognitive approach to understanding religion  by Lehmann, David
 Archives de sciences sociales des religions 
131-132 | juillet - décembre 2005
Varia
The cognitive approach to understanding religion 
À propos de :ATRAN Samuel, In Gods we trust: the evolutionary landscape
of religion. New York, Oxford University Press, 2003.BOYER Pascal, 
Religion explained: the human instincts that fashion gods, spirits and
ancestors. London, Heinemann, 2001.
David Lehmann
Electronic version
URL: http://journals.openedition.org/assr/3076
DOI: 10.4000/assr.3076
ISSN: 1777-5825
Publisher
Éditions de l’EHESS
Printed version
Date of publication: 1 December 2005
Number of pages: 199-213
ISBN: 2-7132-2045-9
ISSN: 0335-5985
 
Electronic reference
David Lehmann, « The cognitive approach to understanding religion  », Archives de sciences sociales
des religions [Online], 131-132 | juillet - décembre 2005, Online since 14 February 2006, connection on
30 April 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/assr/3076  ; DOI : 10.4000/assr.3076 
This text was automatically generated on 30 April 2019.
© Archives de sciences sociales des religions
The cognitive approach to
understanding religion 1
À propos de :ATRAN Samuel, In Gods we trust: the evolutionary landscape
of religion. New York, Oxford University Press, 2003.BOYER Pascal, 
Religion explained: the human instincts that fashion gods, spirits and
ancestors. London, Heinemann, 2001.
David Lehmann
1 One reasonable response to the vast enterprise of comparing religions, their institutions
and the behaviour of their followers is a nagging doubt:  after all  this,  is there much
difference among the world religions, or indeed between the world religions on one hand,
and the innumerable polytheistic and pagan forms across the planet? Recent work in
cognitive psychology applied to religion, especially that of Boyer and Atran (Boyer, 2001;
Atran, 2003), both strongly influenced by Sperber (Sperber, 1996), has made a strong case
for the claim that practices which, taken together, have come to be classified and bundled
together as “religious”, can be explained in terms of human evolution. Part of their case
rests on the observation of constants across vast distances in time, space and language,
while  another  part  rests  on  experimental  evidence  from cognitive  and  evolutionary
psychology. In this paper I explain why social scientists cannot afford to ignore this work.
2 Social scientists tend to regard the use of evolutionary explanations of social phenomena
with much distrust. Indeed, sociology itself as a discipline was built to a large extent on
the rejection of versions of evolution. The reasons for this are several. Firstly, the word
refers  to  a  process  whereby  an  institution  or  set  of  practices  are  suitable  to  the
functioning  of  society  –  it  is  therefore  regarded  as  a  functionalist  argument  and
vulnerable to the usual criticisms of functionalism – among which are functionalism's
alleged prejudice in favour of the preservation of order over change, and its use of effects
to explain causes.  Secondly,  because of the perverse,  and perverted,  history of social
Darwinism and the importance of hostility to it in the history of sociology, evolution
carries connotations of a concern with differences among human racial categories, even
though these connotations are quite foreign to Darwinian evolution (if not precisely to
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Darwin's  personal  outlook)  (Malik,  2000).  (Though sociologists  hypostasize “societies”
and their boundaries in a manner which is just as vague and metaphorical, and with no
firmer basis in demonstrable boundaries than those who would view races as bounded
entities.) Thirdly, evolution is often associated by social scientists with an explanation in
terms of teleology, whereby a process or institution is explained by its outcome – again
something  quite  foreign  to  Darwinian  evolution,  which  proceeds  by  adaptation  and
natural selection. And, fourthly, social scientists associate evolution with a crude notion
of stages, or linearity, as vulgarized in certain versions of Marxism (the succession of
modes  of  production),  and  of  concepts  of  modernization,  which  have  been  much
criticized,  with reason,  but  which themselves  were  developed either  in  ignorance of
biological evolution or on the basis of a misreading of it. The sense in which evolution is
used here is totally different from these connotations attributed to it in common social
science parlance 2.
3 In  Atran's  formulation,  religion  is  not  in  itself  an  evolutionary  adaptation  –  indeed
religion is hardly a single phenomenon at all. Rather, it involves “a variety of cognitive
and affective  systems,  some with  separate  evolutionary  histories,  and some with  no
evolutionary  history  to  speak  of.  Of  those  with  an  evolutionary  history,  some parts
plausibly  have  an  adaptive  story,  while  others  are  more  likely  by-products.  Both
adaptations  and  by-products,  in  turn,  have  been culturally  co-opted  or  ‘exapted’,  in
religion, to new functions absent from ancestral environments, and which may have little
if  any  systematic  relationship  to  genetic  fitness,  such as  spiritual  fulfilment,  artistic
creation, mass scarification, and human sacrifice.” (p. 265). Unlike language, “for religion
there is  no integrated set  of  cognitive principles that  could represent a task-specific
evolution”.
4 Exaptation, a term coined by the late Stephen Jay Gould (Gould and Vrba, 1982), closely
linked to Darwin's idea of preadaptation, refers to forms or features whose function has
changed, or which have acquired a function where none seemed to have existed before.
For example, as a result of selection and adaptation, “insect wings and bird feathers...
appear to have been initially selected for thermal regulation and only later co-opted for
flight in the subsequent evolutionary history of insects and birds” (p. 44). Gould's famous
architectural example was the spandrel (Gould and Lewontin, 1979), the space between
the outer curve of an arch and the imaginary square or rectangular shape which frames
the arch: this space, originally functionless but essential for the construction of an arch,
became, with Romanesque and Gothic architecture, the location for such elaborate and
eye-catching decoration and visual exposition that it often even took precedence over the
arch itself, as many tourists will testify. One big debate between Gould and evolutionary
psychologists  is  whether,  on  the  model  of  the  spandrel,  cultural  phenomena  are
elaborated spandrels whose dormant potential has been co-opted by a “big brain” which
itself  “grew larger  under  selection  for  hunting  and gathering”  (Atran,  p. 45):  this  is
cultural, not natural selection. An alternative approach essentially finds this argument
too vague: the “big brain” tells us nothing about cognitive structures (p. 46) and although
elaborate  cultural  spandrels,  like  religion,  may  have  no  evolutionary  history,  their
component parts do. Indeed, following Dennett (Dennett, 1995), Atran seems to question
whether one can draw a clear line between “original” functionlessness and adaptation,
since  “to  some  degree  all  adaptations  were  originally functionless  or  secondary
consequences of prior adaptations, then co-opted and subsequently adapted to perform
new functions” (p. 44). This is a prelude to the argument that although evolution has little
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to contribute to an explanation of “religion” as a package, it does have much to say about
the elements which make it up.
5 Ancestral environments mean simply the environments in which selection originally took
place. They account for “much of human history because they are the conditions under
which we evolved as a distinct species” (Boyer, p. 133). Institutional life – with formal
rules – is only a few seconds of human history compared to the thousands of years of
“foraging for food in small nomadic groups, in which close cooperation [was] a matter of
survival and information [was] richly transmitted through example and communication”
(ibid.), but without formal rules and the self-aware collective memory which goes with
them.  Many  mechanisms of  information-detection  and  interpretation,  and  of  risk
aversion, evolved during that long ancestral period and later acquired a common heading
“religion”. Much of these two books describes and explains this. At the risk of simplifying,
they  confirm  our  common  standard  distinction  between  popular  and  erudite  or
institutional religion by showing how “supernatural agency”, described by Atran (p. 57)
as  “the most  culturally  recurrent,  cognitively  relevant  and evolutionarily  compelling
concept in religion” is “culturally derived from innate cognitive schema”. But note the
careful formulation: supernatural agency (devils, spirits, and dragons appearing in cloud
formations)  is  not  itself  innate  –  it  is  “culturally  derived”  from  “innate  cognitive
schema”. The cultural derivation is seen, for example, in the creation of entities (gods,
dragons, spirits) which activate modular processes by riding “piggy back” on modular
processes:  they are easily transmitted “from mind to mind” and also relevant across
innumerable specific conditions, so they are more likely to endure over time, as we see in
the pervasive belief in the supernatural across the globe and throughout human history
(Atran, p. 70).
6 Social  scientists  are not  taken aback when authors  skip back and forth between the
Chassidim of Williamsburg, the Fang of Cameroon and Western France, for example, as
Boyer and Atran do. But the difference is that, in tune with their unit of analysis, the
individual, cognitivists treat these cases as illustrative of common features while social
scientists  look  for  differences.  There  is  nothing  wrong  with  this  sort  of  macro-
comparison, but, for all that it is fascinating and creative, its conclusions are undermined
by the difficulty one experiences in drawing boundaries round units of analysis, and not
only in the globalized world of today: where does “Western France” begin and end? Why
should we take Spain or Italy to be units when for centuries they were spaces populated
by peoples speaking different languages and then large proportions of their populations
migrated to the Americas? At least individuals have tangible boundaries, and thus can be
convincingly constituted as units of analysis. The cognitive approach provides a strategy
for  carving  clearly  delimited,  researchable  questions  out  of  these  big  theoretical
questions. The unit of analysis is the individual and the method is experimental or quasi-
experimental,  as  when Atran or  Barrett  (who has  worked with Boyer)  or  Boyer  and
Barrett test combinations of concepts or narrative sequences, for memorability. To decry
this as reductionist is, as Sperber says, to imply that these objects of study command a
clearly demarcated theory and that the social, or cultural, is also clearly demarcated from
the psychological, which is not the case (Sperber, 1996). Sociologists and anthropologists
have a longstanding hostility to psychological explanations but if the object of study is
memory, it is hard to see why there should be a problem, especially if it can be related to
neurobiology. In any case, care is taken to carry out the same or comparable experiments
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in radically different cultural settings (viz. among US university students and later among
Yukatek Mayan speakers 3 or, in Boyer's case, in Nepal, Cameroon and – again – with US
university students.)
7 More mundanely,  we can note  that  religious  rituals  and practices  become particular
prominent in all societies at times of stress and passage: it is a commonplace that people
who would never otherwise set foot in a place of worship, often take care to celebrate or
commemorate or mark a birth,  marriage,  or,  most notably,  death,  with some sort  of
religious ritual. Atran quotes empirical psychological evidence of how people have a very
pronounced tendency to associate the word “God” with death and sadness (p. 66). It is
hard to imagine a society with no religion. It is likewise interesting to note that although
little energy is spent in the literature on defining religion, there is little dispute about
what constitutes an object of study for those studying religion: in other words, we share
an intuition that a wide range of phenomena and practices do belong together. Although
these phenomena take place in different languages and seem superficially to belong to
utterly  different  domains  (compare  horror-inducing  Balinese  dances  with  a  Quaker
meeting or a 24-hour fast) humans from the most diverse backgrounds have no trouble in
agreeing that they all fall into a single domain of thought and knowledge. Of course this
assumption of sameness limits the scope of Atran's and Boyer's enquiries, which are very
much focused on mental representations, rather than doctrines or institutions. Indeed,
Boyer  switches  into  a  rational  choice  framework  when  he  comes  to  discuss  the
institutionalized dimension of world religions – as opposed to their   popular' dimension,
which is very much the privileged object of cognitive analysis.
8 This  non-institutionalized,  non-theological,  dimension  of  religion  is  precisely  the
dimension which is  most commonly left  unsaid and unenunciated by either religious
office-holders (in institutionalized religions) or by their followers, and indeed often by
sociologists. Boyer (p. 100-105), who can only rarely resist a joke, calls it the non-serious
version, of the supernatural: people enunciate a theologically correct view (an expression
coined  by  Justin  Barrett)  but  in  practice  they  implicitly  hold  to  something  rather
different, if only because our lives would be unliveable if we attempted to live as if most
theological claims were true (viz. to live as if God knew our every act and thought and
would punish us correspondingly in the world to come; or to follow the Talmud's private
law  prescriptions  which  hundreds  of  thousands  of  yeshiva  boys  and  adult  students
scrutinize and memorize daily worldwide.) And popular religion – healing, possession,
rites  of  passage  –  exhibits  striking  similarities  across  cultural  and  geographical
boundaries. So the use of the individual as the unit of analysis for understanding the
archetypal constants of popular religion – though not, of course, all aspects of it – is
perfectly  defensible.  And  as  we  have  said,  advancing  sociologically  more  acceptable
claims about differences between “cultures” or “societies”, in circumstances where it is
impossible to know where these begin and where they end, imposes evident limitations
on those categories as units of analysis (Lehmann, 2001).
9 Although,  if  we  allow  our  imagination  to  wander,  the  possibilities  for  proliferating
supernatural concepts may appear to be literally infinite, more careful observation shows
that  only  a  restricted  range  of  representations  are  used  anywhere.  One  set  are
representations which help us to detect what is going on in other minds – and to cope
with the uncertainty that we can ever really know, or the certainty that we can never
really know, what a colleague, a neighbour or a passer-by for that matter, is thinking of
us! Another, not unrelated, is the attribution of agency in explaining that which we do
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not understand. A third is what I would call the way in which archetypal supernatural
representations are “tweaked” versions of standard ontologies.
10 The idea that we need a “theory of mind” in order to function fully as individuals is by
now a central concept in cognitive psychology which has gained widespread currency in
studies of autism by Simon Baron-Cohen and many others, some even earlier (Byrne and
Whiten,  1988;  Baron-Cohen,  1995).  The idea  turns  out  to  be  extremely  fertile  in  the
understanding of religion, as belief in witchcraft illustrates.  Much witchcraft is about
divination,  especially  about  finding  out  why  misfortune  happens  to  an  individual:
individuals know that misfortunes happen by chance, of course, but as anthropologists,
beginning with Evans-Pritchard, have often said, they are mystified and often troubled by
the question “why me?” One type of answer is that someone has put a spell on a person,
which in turn produces anxiety about who did it, and why, and thus a deep curiosity
about what is going on in that someone's mind. Witches, sorcerers and soothsayers satisfy
this curiosity but they do not fully relieve our anxiety and may even aggravate it, since
they are not fully trusted and may be in league with rivals or enemies. (Psychoanalysis,
with its codes of practice and regulatory associations, can be seen as providing a different
type of  confidante,  in  a  modern,  impersonal  framework designed to  ensure trust  by
establishing safeguards, boundaries and professional associations to police them. One can
trust one's psychoanalyst, or indeed one's doctor, with the most embarrassing secrets
precisely because one's contact with the professional is cut off from private life – unlike
contact with witches.) In our daily lives we are constantly assailed by doubts about what
others are saying and doing and thinking about us: if we did not have such doubts we
would not  be human,  because humans owe their  uniqueness,  and their  survival  as  a
species, to their ability to represent the thoughts and feelings of others. And of course
anxiety in the face of others' intentions makes people more alert to danger and thus more
likely to survive. But, although anxiety can so easily go too far, and become a clinical
condition – paranoia – to the point of self-destruction or destruction of others, people
generally look for motivation without going mad: they ask whether someone is not taking
advantage of  them, whether they are not being cheated (p. 225-229) or,  worse,  being
mistaken for a cheat. In West Africa Pentecostal churches recruit, inter alia, among middle
class  people who,  having  made  headway  in  the  urban  setting  or  having  obtained  a
precious job in the bureaucracy, find themselves under siege from demanding relatives.
They fear that the relatives will heap curses upon them if they are turned away – yet they
know of course that if they are too generous they will bring themselves down again: so
they join Pentecostal churches to take advantage of the protective shield of the churches'
thick social frontiers and fiery anti-devil rhetoric (Meyer, 1998). In this light, the paradox
of churches which, while decrying the paganism of indigenous cults, themselves practice
exorcisms which mimic those cults, is understandable (Lehmann, 2001). The converts find
protection in the multiple social obligations and frequent church attendance which come
with  the  Pentecostal  membership,  and  simply  makes  them  unavailable  to  their
troublesome kin. Not that their new life is without its burdens: Pentecostal conversion
slots individuals into a new web of exchanges which replace those they are trying to
shake off.
11 Boyer  agrees  with much of  the  traditional  anthropological  interpretation,  but  seems
unsatisfied with the metaphorical interpretation of supernatural entities. After all, since
people clearly know perfectly well, for example, that ancestors are not really agents, why
do they attribute their misfortunes to punishments by those ancestors? They cannot be
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consciously using the ancestors as a kind of symbolic projection of their own moral code,
for symbols do not work in such self-aware ways – yet for the most part if they attribute
some injury or misfortune to the action of ancestors, they know it is because they have
consciously or unconsciously broken some sort of norm or code. Boyer solves this puzzle
by  invoking  people's  “inference  systems  for  social  interaction,  which...guide  their
intuitions about exchange and fairness” (p. 229). In other words, they experience feelings
of guilt vis-à-vis ancestors to whom they owe so much. Boyer's application of the model
of social exchange is evidently applicable to the innumerable pilgrimages and local cults
which  characterize  popular  Catholicism  worldwide:  people  first  go  to  ask  for  an
intercession  by  a  Saint  or  by  a  particular  Virgin  – viz.  Guadalupe  or Lourdes –  by
depositing a voto, and then later return with an ex-voto if their wishes are fulfilled. In
Israel I attended the annual festivities at Meron on Lag B'Omer 4. Here Chassidim would
emerge from their buses unloading 54 5 bottles of grape juice to offer to others in the
hope of achieving a desire, such as finding a wife or having a child. A voto in effect. Not
any kind of desire of course – a desire which fits in to the cycle of Orthodox Jewish life.
Then, when the child is born, or the wedding held, the family makes a donation to their
community to mark the occasion. If  one does not fulfil  the promise,  one experiences
feelings of guilt, and the ancestors, or a spirit, will threaten revenge.
12 Boyer  also  invokes,  in  this  explanation  of  folk  accounts  of  the  supernatural,  “our
propensity to think of salient events in terms of human interaction” (p. 231): “whenever a
striking occurrence is represented in the mind, this produces an interpretation in terms
of  ‘someone’  acting.”  (p. 229).  Atran  is  more  forthright:  “cognitive  schemata  for
recognizing and interpreting animate agents may be part of our evolutionary heritage,
which primes us to anticipate intention in the unseen causes of uncertain situations”
(p. 61),  a  hypothesis  which is  developed into the human propensity to look for  end-
oriented agency. This is supported by evidence from experiments with babies and adults,
showing that “the attribution of intentional agency to abstract objects is spontaneous and
natural” (p. 63). In addition, Atran develops ideas about how we interpret events as guided
by a controlling force, as goal-directed, even though we may not perceive agency behind
them. Usually the howl of the wind is just the howl of the wind, but just in case it is a
threatening  being  or  animal  our  senses  are  honed  to  be  frightened  by  it.  Such
propensities may sound fanciful to the sociologist, but as evolutionary outcomes they
make  sense;  because  they  have  been  selected,  of  course,  there  remains  enormous
variation,  ranging  from blithe  inattention  to  risk  to  caution,  anxiety,  and  paranoia.
Notions of  the divine are,  among other things,  almost  always notions about animate
agency  as  a  cause  of  the  incomprehensible.  Justin  Barrett  (Barrett,  2001)  uses
experimental evidence to show, albeit tentatively, that children's God concepts, though
highly agent-based, can accommodate more abstract features than expected, but also that
adults “under cognitive pressure” revert to “simpler, more anthropomorphic concepts”
(p. 180). Being cautious, he adds that many more studies across cultures are required to
confirm this idea. Atran quotes experiments, including some conducted by him, which
point to a “cognitive susceptibility” to invoke supernatural agents so as to account for
“emotionally disruptive” events which seem to have a controlling force but no agent to
guide them – typhoons, earthquakes, etc. Since any grasp of the passage of time entails an
awareness of death, people risk being haunted by the thought of their own death on a
more or less uninterrupted basis, and the introduction of a supernatural agent relieves
this anxiety.
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13 Conversation with haredi (ultra-Orthodox) Jews, as well as Jewish prayer, is punctuated by
references to the yetzer hara, the   drive' to evil, a concept which also embodies agency.
While undertaking research in Jerusalem, I  attended a study group where the leader
spoke of  this drive as developing freely in children until  the age of  13,  thus gaining
thirteen years' advantage over the countervailing forces of morality. He speculated that
bad  behaviour  or  impudence  (chutzpah)  in  a  child  may  be  traced  to  the  mother's
menstruation, or her failure to fulfil ritual bathing obligations, at the time of conception.
(Sex  is  forbidden  between  the  first  signs  of  a  woman's  period  until  the  period  is
completed and she has visited the mikveh, or ritual bath.) The drive to evil, in his mind,
was not just a drive, but had to be traced back to an act, and the punishment of that act.
And that act in turn was a type of violation of an exchange: all  these mitzvoth,  these
commandments and their fulfilment, can be seen as one side of a contract (God's covenant
with  Abraham),  and  the  supernatural  elements  as  a  vehicle  for  guilt  feelings  which
cannot be expressed in terms of physical cause and effect.
14 Atran and Boyer do not, on the face of it, explain why successive generations might pay
for  the  sins  of  their  fathers,  unto  the  “third  and  fourth  generation”  as  the  Ten
Commandments so frighteningly spell out, or for the sins of the mothers in the words of
the study group leader mentioned above. This is by no means an unusual notion, and is
similar to that found in African and Brazilian possession cults, where personal problems,
particularly perhaps those relating to fertility and marriage, are traced back to previous
generations  or  lateral  kin  (Birman,  1998).  Parents  and  grandparents,  or  sisters  and
brothers and cousins, said to have made unspeakable pacts with the Devil – in order to
win a woman or even simply to have a child – are blamed for present ills: their offences
are visited upon their lateral kin as well as their descendants. Their unclean or shameful
exchange spreads pollution through their kindred, but it also opens the way to a solution.
These beliefs facilitate release from the curse because the fault, once diagnosed, can be
repaired: the medium, or, in another Ghanaian example, the Pentecostal pastor (Meyer,
1998; Lehmann, 2001), can perform the appropriate ceremony of unmaking the pledge, or
exorcism.  If  the problem arises  because of  a  promise or  exchange entered into with
dishonest intentions, then the ritual of exorcism may repair the offence by pronouncing
that  responsibility  to  lie  not  precisely  with  a  person,  but  with  the  evil  which  was
possessing an individual – and so the evil acquires a name and an identity and the person,
the apparent  agent,  is  absolved.  Thus  we make sense of  an important  role  taken in
Pentecostal exorcisms by the summoning of the evil to say its name, to admit an identity,
an agency and a motive. 
15 Neo-Pentecostal  churches  have  elevated  exchange  into  a  central  feature  of  their
relationship with their followers: “only by giving will you receive”, they tell them, and a
half hour can easily be devoted to fund-raising during a religious service (Lehmann, 1996;
Birman and Lehmann, 1999). In the Jewish case one type of exchange occurs when people
go to obtain a blessing from an important Rabbi,  which generally involves making a
donation to his institution. The Lubavitcher Rebbe – a charismatic innovator who made
his sect into the thriving evangelizing enterprise it now is – used to give all his visitors a
dollar bill, but of course many of those visitors will have made generous donations to his
organization.  In  all  these  examples,  moral  pressure is  translated into  the  “inference
system” in which fair exchange triggers very strong feelings: the ritual of giving in neo-
Pentecostal churches makes non-givers feel very exposed and guilty, and the multifarious
activities  Churches  provide  for  their  followers  (choirs,  business  and  labour  market
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contacts,  counselling)  make  them  ever  more  beholden  and  therefore  ever  more
vulnerable to feelings of guilt if they withhold their dues or even their supplementary
contributions. At this point the rational choice approach converges with the cognitive,
for the rational choice account revolves crucially around the “free rider problem”: in
Iannacone's interpretation, for example, and in Berman's explanation of ultra-Orthodoxy
in Israel (Iannacone, 1997; Berman, 2000), the stringency of Jewish haredi life and the
heavy demands of evangelical churches on their members arise from a need to ensure
that people do not join only for the advantages – the mutual aid, the low cost commercial
circuits, the social support networks, and in some cases, as in Israel,  the government
subsidies – but also out of a real sense of commitment. The commitment is shown by
contributing their  “share”,  by performing tasks in church,  making donations,  and in
addition making non-reciprocal sacrifices,  by dressing in certain ways, by renouncing
certain types of sexual pleasure and the like. The rational choice approach has difficulty
accounting for such gratuitous sacrifice, or, as Atran would put it, costly and hard-to-fake
acts, because rational choice has a one-dimensional concept of the returns or rewards of
religious – or any other – activity. However, Atran develops a cognitive extension of the
free rider/stringency argument:  a person ready to risk the ultimate sacrifice is more
likely to be trusted by others as a partner in a cooperative venture, and so we demand
leaders who make sacrifices: they give up sex, or the pursuit of worldly comforts, to be
priests; they must sometimes make great sacrifices to make their promises convincing
(p. 131).  Atran gives  chilling examples  from Maya stelae and astonishing accounts  of
suicide bombers, but he might also have described how the contemporary media treat
celebrities, public figures, politicians and royalty – or rather how these figures expose
themselves to media-born abuse.
16 Atran states that “invocation of supernatural agents constitutes an ecologically rational
response to the enhanced possibilities of deception inherent in the evolution of human
representational  skills  and social  interaction”  (p. 117).  Humans'  metarepresentational
cognitive capacities mean that we all know that we can deceive one another yet we are
also, broadly, aware that if we persist in deceiving one another we will cease to exist –
and the “moral basis of community life” (ibid.) will founder. Witches and mafia, who live
by deception, are held up as examples of what can go wrong. Yet of course we persist in
wrongdoing,  in deception,  and in being tempted to deal  with witches and the mafia,
despite the warnings – from the Pentecostal churches for example – that, whatever their
short-term benefits, such dealings bring disaster in the long run.
17 So we have simultaneously to prove to one another, on a continuous basis, both that we
understand deception, and that we can be trusted. We also have to take account of the
transparency of hypocrisy: pure exchange theories like rational choice would not take
into account the difficulties created by faking, yet it would be impossible to build the
minimum cooperation required for social institutions to work even in the most adverse
circumstances if people's commitment could be seen, or even just felt, to be too often
insincere. Sincerity, however, is an emotion, and so there are occasions when sincerity
goes  overboard just  as  when distrust  goes  too far,  in  the same way as  prudent  risk
aversion can spill over into paranoia. There are “fitness gains” (an evolutionary term)
and there are costs in being sincere (p. 131), because we are for ever navigating in an
uncertain world. In Bernard Williams' words: “We want people to have a disposition of
sincerity which is centred on sustaining and developing relations with others that involve
different  kinds  and  degrees  of  trust.”  (Williams,  2002)  He  calls  it  a  disposition,  and
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specifically says that it is not just a disposition to follow a rule, because that would be too
rigid.  However,  in  his  usage  (Williams,  2002,  p. 120)  it  could  also  be  described  as
susceptibility to honour and shame, and thus an emotion.
18 The machines of cooperation, like those of hate and conflict, are driven by emotions. By
taking emotions into account as  products  of  evolution which help us  to survive and
reproduce,  and  as  tools  for  understanding  the  motivations  of  others  and  their
representations  of  the  motivations  of  ourselves  and  “other  others”
(“metarepresentations”), we can see how to stand in awe of a supernatural entity is a very
suitable device, because we use it in only a half-naïve manner. That is, individuals' own
fear of supernatural agency may be naïve, but they are canny in their perceptions of
other people's fear of it, and in their use of that insight. So we also recognize, intuitively,
behaviour which arouses or responds to this fear, even across cultural boundaries, and
this cognitive capacity enables people from the most diverse backgrounds to recognize
certain types of behaviour, with no need for explanation or definition, as religious.
19 The other core feature of supernatural representation in both Boyer and Atran is the
frequent,  even  defining  presence,  in such  representations  of  detailed,  but  crucial
“ontological violations”, (Boyer, p. 90-101) or violations of intuitive expectations about
folkbiology and folkpsychology' (Atran, p. 99), prefigured in a lecture given in London by
Sperber  in  1984  (Sperber,  1996).  In  Boyer's  words  “the  combination  of  ontological
violation and preserved inferential  potential  explains  the  family  resemblance  among
supernatural  concepts”  (p. 90).  In  Atran's  “all  religious  traditions  include  ...  public
expressions of beliefs in which assignment to one of the primary ontological domains fails
because  further  processing  in  accordance  with  intuitively  innate  expectations  about
folkmechanics,  folkbiology  and  folkpsychology  is  blocked”  (p. 99)  These  ontological
categories or domains are “innate, ‘basic’, commonsense”, “intuitive” and so on. One of
their most arresting insights is that these violations – which we might in daily parlance
call violations of archetypes or stereotypes – are small: that is to say, if they are to be
successful, if they are to survive and be repeated over many generations, the violations
must be limited. The explanation is that this facilitates memory: Atran explores what he
calls  memorability,  after  Sperber,  in  a  manner  which  strikingly  inverts  our  usual
approaches to the sociology of belief, asking not what it is about individuals or groups
that leads them to recall certain things, but what it is about certain things that makes
them particularly suitable for retention in the memory. Where Boyer's research shows
that there are better memory effects for ontological violations than for mere oddities,
Atran  goes  further  in  order  to  understand  how  not  just  specific  images  or  iconic
representations, but long stories such as the life of Christ or of King David or the history
of the Children of Israel (my examples) manage to survive over thousands of years, and
finds,  on  the  basis  of  further  experiments,  that  a  “small  proportion  of  minimally
counterintuitive  beliefs  give  the  story  a  mnemonic  advantage  over  stories  with  no
counterintuitive beliefs or with too many” (p. 107).
20 So what is meant by these weird violations? “[People] have a concept of agents that can
hear you wherever you are; they also have a concept of artefacts that can hear you. But
they do not have a concept of artefacts that can hear you wherever you are” (Boyer,
p. 99-100). For example, we have innumerable accounts of visions of the Virgin in which
she speaks to a person, and millions of Christians go and pray to the image of a particular
saint or to a particular image of Christ or the Virgin (viz. the Virgin of Guadalupe); these
apparitions and images communicate with each individual. But no one has claimed that
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one of these apparitions or images can address a crowd or see into the minds of millions
of people at once: the accounts of eyewitnesses to Bernadette's visions at Lourdes and the
conversations she had with aqueyro (“that thing”) as she always called it, are from people
who stood next to her, intimate associates or companions who did not themselves see the
apparition  (Harris,  1999).  Boyer  remarks  that  a  “combination  of  one  violation  with
preserved  expectations  is  probably  a  cognitive  optimum”  (p. 100).  Further  examples
which imitate, though they do not replicate, those which litter Boyer's text, could be of
the following sort:  we would not be surprised if  someone told us that slaughtering a
chicken in a particular  procedure would protect  them from betrayal  by their  spouse
(especially if the person came from Brazil, or Cuba or West Africa); we might not agree
with the causal inferences (and the speaker in any case would be talking of hope rather
than experience, let alone experiment); but neither would we regard the implausibility of
the person's expectations as evidence that they think in quite different ways from us, or
that  their  mind or  brain  functioned strangely.  After  all,  the  chicken was  still  being
slaughtered – the point is that it is not for eating and that the procedure is undertaken in
a ritual setting, with performer and audience in their proper places. On the other hand, if
they said they could prevent their spouse's betrayal by running the washing machine on a
particular  programme  we  would  think  they  were  out  of  their  mind  and  in  need  of
psychiatric treatment.
21 Both authors use rational choice, more avowedly in Boyer's case. Boyer switches gear
audibly when he comes, towards the end, to “doctrines, exclusion and violence”. For him
institutional  religion is  a  straightforwardly  political  phenomenon to  be  explained  in
terms of the pursuit of power, or coalitions. Atran makes use of rational choice in his
account of suicide bombers, on the basis of evidence showing that they are not “suicidal”
at  all  in  the  conventional  sense,  and  also  that  they  are  inserted  in  a  high-pressure
environment, and their acts are explained by the social organization of Middle eastern
society rather than their religion – he notes that the phenomenon did not arise in Bosnia,
when Muslims were subjected to dreadful persecution, but the fierce Arab clan system
was absent.
22 So although the cognitive approach is convincing as an explanation of the universal and
enduring elements which, when taken together, we have come to call “religion”, it sheds
only limited light on the great problems which institutionalized religion is posing today.
But this is hardly a criticism. It is extremely important to come to terms with the human
universals  which underpin religious  emotions  and which are  omnipresent  in  today's
institutionalized religions, in the form of what we call “popular religion”. It is even more
important that social scientists set aside their prejudices against evolutionary ideas and
also against  evolutionary psychology:  we have but  to read the literary magazines  or
watch the television to realize the enormous importance these ideas are acquiring in the
mind of opinion-forming elites, and it is no longer tenable to dismiss them on implied
grounds of racism, or reductionism. These books show that they are based on convincing
empirical evidence and also that they can be expounded in a manner which is coherent
and sometimes arresting.
23 Indeed,  I  end on the subject  of  style.  Both Boyer  and Atran have distinctive,  highly
literate ways of writing. Boyer addresses the reader economically and directly, makes
judicious use of colloquial expressions, and appeals to one's intuition and experience of
daily life, deploying his erudition lightly and explaining the experimental material with
exemplary clarity. As a non-native English speaker, he has much to teach his colleagues in
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academia about the art of communication. Atran is more of a steamroller: not a stone left
unturned,  not  an  ancient  authority  unmentioned.  He  marshalls  a  vast  range  of
experimental evidence, some his own and much drawn from others' research. He takes
delight in making extensive use of what contemporary anthropologists would regard as
outdated authorities, like Tylor, and I am sure that by using these classic ethnographic
sources  he  is  marking  himself  off  from  the  modish  impenetrability  of  much
contemporary anthropology. Where Boyer is carefully honed and almost glass-cut, Atran
writes like a hungry predator,  drawing on a myriad of  sources and inspirations.  The
almost simultaneous appearance of the two books, so similar yet so different, is a strange
occurrence about which there is  little  to say.  What one has to say,  however,  is  that
although up till now social scientists have steadfastly ignored them, they will not be able
to avert their eyes for very long, because they are genuinely original, deeply interesting,
and their ample empirical basis makes them impossible to dismiss.
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NOTES
1. I am indebted to Rob Foley, Michael Mann and Dan Sperber for their comments on this
paper, and to Ilona Roth for making me aware of the relevance of cognitive approaches to
my work as a social scientist.
2. There have been very few reviews or discussions of this work in the social
anthropology literature. In France, where Boyer's book was published as Et l'homme créa
les dieux: comment expliquer la religion, Robert Laffont, 2001, it was reviewed in L'Homme
(Dupré, 2002) and discussed in a review article in Critique (Keck, 2004). The review in 
L'Homme is a bizarre patchwork of tirades and sarcasms against the free market (supposed
to be a basis for experimental psychology) and the United States (where Boyer and Atran
both work, though they are also Directeurs de Recherche at the CNRS). The Critique article
is more sympathetic, placing Boyer's book in the lineage of Sperber and taking it to be the
beginning of a possible paradigm shift in anthropology. Boyer himself has written a
warm, but largely factual, review of Atran's book in Current Anthropology (Boyer, 2004).
3. The use by Atran of the term “Maya” did cause me some anxiety, as this is a
retrospective modern reconstruction of a pre-colonial language or kingdom spread across
a vast region. Is there such a thing today as a Mayan language?
4. The 33rd day of the Omer, which is the period running from Passover to the Feast of
Weeks (Shevuot). While “counting the Omer” observant Jews cannot get married or cut
their hair – except on this day – a sort of Shrove Tuesday. Practices vary, inevitably,
between Sephardim and Ashkenazim, and within the two communities as well.
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5. 54 because it equals three time 18 – and the letters for 18 in Hebrew (chai) also mean
“life”.
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